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INTRODUCTION
The social sciences have developed dramatically over the last century in
both breadth and sophistication.1 These disciplines offer systematic data
collection and an analytic methodology to test our empirical intuitions
about individual behavior and social institutions. Prior to the development
of the social sciences and their application to the legal system, judges could
rely only on their personal experiences and untested empirical intuitions
when faced with complex questions of social fact. 2 A court’s exclusive
reliance on personal experience, however, “could continue only so long as its
‘best guesses’ about [empirical] facts were as good as . . . everyone else’s.”3
Today, social science research exists on a wide range of legal issues, and
courts are faced with the challenge of resolving controversial questions of
empirical fact on the basis of complex and sometimes conflicting scientific
literatures. Courts have, for example, reviewed social science evidence on
racial segregation,4 maximum work hours,5 First Amendment rights,6 jury
size,7 the exclusionary rule,8 eyewitness identification,9 and child custody.10
Yet, despite efforts to encourage the integration of social science into the
judicial process, and despite a modest increase in judicial reliance on social

1 By social sciences, I refer broadly to a range of disciplines including psychology, economics,
sociology, political science, anthropology, demography, and public policy.
2 See David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”: Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 545 (1991) (“Historically, most
constitutional fact-finding depended on the Justices’ best guesses on the matter.”).
3 Id. at 546 (footnote omitted); see also id. (“[I]f [Chief Justice] Marshall[, in Gibbons v. Ogden,] had been confronted . . . with a valid scientific study showing that America’s understanding
of commerce was not as broad as he supposed, the legitimacy of his conclusion would have been
undermined.”).
4 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954) (relying, in part, on psychological research on the impact of segregation on African-American school children).
5 See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419 n.1 (1908) (noting medical and social research
regarding the effects of long working hours on women’s health).
6 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593-94 (1992) (considering psychological research on
the susceptibility of adolescents to peer pressure).
7 See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 101 & nn.48-49 (1970) (discussing statistical research
on whether jury size influences the verdict reached).
8 See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 n.6 (1984) (summarizing sociological
research on the effect of the exclusionary rule on case outcomes).
9 See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 892-912 (N.J. 2011) (reviewing psychological research
on the reliability of different eye witness identification procedures).
10 See, e.g., Sheila Rush Okpaku, Psychology: Impediment or Aid in Child Custody Cases?, 29
RUTGERS L. REV. 1117, 1142-44 (1976).
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science evidence in recent decades,11 courts remain reluctant to incorporate
social science into their decisionmaking.12
In this Comment, I explore the role of social science in the development
of common law precedent. I begin with the assumption that most judges
and legal scholars today would support the use of social science in particular
judicial decisions where the research findings are valid, replicated, consistent across studies, and directly applicable to the legal question at hand. I
focus instead on the problem of suboptimal social science. In the vast
majority of cases only suboptimal evidence is available—that is, evidence
that is valuable but not completely valid, consistent, or directly applicable. Judges and legal scholars have long debated the benefits 13 and
11 See Murray Levine & Barbara Howe, The Penetration of Social Science into Legal Culture, 7
LAW & POL’Y 173, 178-85 (1985) (discussing an increase in the use of social science evidence by
the Supreme Court from 1908 to 1983); Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Legal Positivism as
Legal Information, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1080, 1108 (1997) (“[S]tarting in 1991, there has been a
substantial and continuing increase in the [Supreme] Court’s citation of nonlegal sources.”).
12 See Tracey L. Meares, Three Objections to the Use of Empiricism in Criminal Law and Procedure—And Three Answers, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 851, 853-54 (noting that the “penetration of the
social science into legal areas” remains “shallow after all of these years”); see also Donald N. Bersoff &
David J. Glass, The Not-So Weisman : The Supreme Court’s Continuing Misuse of Social Science
Research, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 279, 281 (1995) (noting the Supreme Court’s “longstanding ambivalence toward social science research”). This reluctance is perhaps even stronger in
foreign courts. See Niels Petersen, Avoiding the Common Wisdom Fallacy: The Role of Social Sciences
in Constitutional Adjudication 2 (Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods, Paper No.
2011/22, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1923012 (asserting that European courts are less
receptive to the use of empirical studies when crafting constitutional law).
13 See, e.g., James R. Acker, Social Science in Supreme Court Criminal Cases and Briefs: The Actual
and Potential Contribution of Social Scientists as Amici Curiae, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 25, 41 (1990)
(arguing that social scientists should submit amicus briefs and cautioning that they should “help
[ judges] become familiar with . . . the limitations and proper interpretations of relevant
research”); David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law
as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1025 (1989) (noting that social science provides
“objective understanding derived through controlled systematic inquiry”); Carl E. Schneider &
Lee E. Teitelbaum, Life’s Golden Tree: Empirical Scholarship and American Law, 53 UTAH L. REV.
53, 62-66 (2006) (declaring that the case for employing social science is “embarrassingly simple”
because its use clearly adds to the knowledge of the decisionmaker); Peter W. Sperlich, Postrealism:
Should Ignorance Be Elevated to a Principle of Adjudication?, 64 JUDICATURE 93, 95-96 (1980)
(acknowledging the drawbacks of social science in judicial decisionmaking, but advocating its use
as the best tool available); Christoph Engel, The Difficult Reception of Rigorous Descriptive Social
Science in the Law 29-31 (Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods, Paper No. 2006/1,
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=875797 (asserting that the use of social science reduces
the risk of “materially wrong” decisions based on “mere introspection, or . . . the everyday
experience the judge shares with all other members of society”). Similarly, Rosenblum writes,

[W]hen judges condition legal conclusions on contemporary community standards or
prevailing custom or questions of whether a reasonable man would have reacted as
did one of the parties in the case, or whether children who come from integrated
schools feel and perform better than children who come from racially segregated
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disadvantages14 of using this kind of limited empirical research in judicial
decisionmaking. And litigants frequently argue that courts should not rely
upon specific social science evidence because of limitations in the literature.15 Yet courts are given relatively little guidance on how to address
suboptimal social science in the development of precedent.16
In Part I, I provide a brief history and typology of the uses of social science
in the courts. I discuss the traditional distinction between adjudicative and
legislative facts,17 as well as other conceptual developments proposed more
recently by Monahan and Walker.18
In Part II, I survey many of the common limitations of individual studies,
which scholars and litigants frequently use to argue that a court should
ignore a particular scientific study in developing common law precedent.
These limitations include methodological weaknesses and potential biases of
the researchers. Given that “courts often cannot avoid basing legal rules on
empirical assumptions,”19 I observe that the negative consequences of these
limitations will reappear regardless of whether courts choose to rely on

schools, the courts should not be allowed to get by with visceral or subjective notions
of how and why people believe as they do.
Victor Rosenblum, A Place for Social Science Along the Judiciary’s Constitutional Law Frontier, 66 NW.
U. L. REV. 455, 479 (1971).
14 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (“[P]roving broad sociological propositions by statistics is a dubious business, and one that inevitably is in tension with the normative
philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection Clause.”); Andrew Greeley, Debunking the Role of
Social Scientists in Court, HUM. RTS., May 1978, at 34, 35 (arguing that social science should have
only a minor role in judicial decisionmaking because social science “is not scientific the way other
sciences are”); Philip R. Lochner, Jr., Some Limits on the Application of Social Science Research in the
Legal Process, 1973 LAW & SOC. ORD. 815, 835-40 (describing factors limiting the judicial use of
social science, such as institutional constraints and insufficient training); David M. O’Brien, The
Seduction of the Judiciary: Social Science and the Courts, 64 JUDICATURE 8, 11, 17-21 (1980) (arguing
that “judges should abandon the practice of justifying their decisions on the basis of empirical
propositions”); Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science:
Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91, 119-52 (1993); cf. Erica Beecher-Monas,
Blinded by Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in Scientific Evidence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 55, 66-67
(1998) (asserting that many judges fail to assess the scientific validity of particular forms of
evidence and, as a result, admit “so-called experts [who] are wrong as often as they are right”);
Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 1329, 1375-77 (1971) (arguing that the use of mathematical or probabilistic methods in court
may undermine public confidence in the judicial system).
15 See infra notes 78-80, 94, 106, 149, and accompanying text.
16 But see John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Empirical Questions Without Empirical Answers,
1991 WIS. L. REV. 569, 578-81 (considering how courts should decide questions of common law
precedent where no relevant empirical social science evidence is available).
17 See infra Section I.A.
18 See infra Sections I.B–C.
19 Monahan & Walker, supra note 16, at 581.
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social science to ground their decisions in particular cases. Without guidance
from social science on complex empirical questions, judges must rely on their
own empirical intuitions formed through a process subject to the same set
of limitations. Thus, limitations on social science studies should not presumptively preclude their use in the development of judicial precedent.
In Part III, I consider limitations on the value of social science to judicial
precedent that inhere in larger bodies of social science research rather than individual studies. I focus on two limiting characteristics in particular: the size
of the literature and the consistency of the results. Scholars and litigants
have used these characteristics to argue that a court should ignore a scientific
literature in resolving a question of precedent. They have argued, for
example, that subsequent research may overturn current scientific theory,
and that courts are ill equipped to assess social science research critically. I
show that these limitations are often overstated and describe a number of
common institutional mechanisms to address them. In addition, after noting
the infeasibility of common solutions proposed by legal scholars, I suggest
that existing permanent staff attorney positions in federal and state courts
offer a unique and cost-effective method to bring social science expertise
into the courthouse.
I. TYPOLOGY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE IN COURTS
In this first Part, I outline a typology of the various purposes for which
courts use social science research, and discuss the relevant procedures for
each of these uses. As I note below, the well-established rules that govern
the admission of evidence at trial do not appear to apply to social science
used to resolve questions of legal precedent. For good reasons, courts have
significant discretion in receiving and obtaining social science evidence for
this narrow purpose.
A. Adjudicative and Legislative Facts
Historically, the use of social science in the development of common law
precedent posed a procedural complexity in American courts. As a general
matter, judges answer questions of law, and juries answer questions of fact.20
Factfinders are charged with weighing the evidence21 presented to the court.
20 See DAVID P. LEONARD, A NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE—
SELECTED RULES OF LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY § 1.2 (1997) (distinguishing the roles of the
judge and jury).
21 See id. (noting that the jury “must weigh the value of the evidence it has been permitted to
hear”).
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Appellate courts may review trial court findings, but only if such findings
are “clearly erroneous.”22 This does not mean, however, that appellate courts
may not review evidence on their own. Federal judges are permitted to
obtain facts independently (without admission into the record) if they are
“not subject to reasonable dispute.”23 These facts must be “generally known
within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction” or “can be accurately and
readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned.”24
These general principles of legal practice were challenged in Muller v.
Oregon,25 which scholars often cite as the first use of social science evidence
in an American court.26 In Muller, the owner of a laundry company challenged
the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting women from working over ten
hours per day in certain industries. 27 As counsel for the State, Louis
Brandeis submitted a brief that described medical and social science studies
finding a negative effect of long working hours on women’s health. 28
Though acknowledging that the underlying empirical studies were not,
“technically speaking, authorities,”29 the Court found that the “widespread
and long continued belief ” that the studies represented was “worthy of
consideration.”30
The use of social science evidence in Muller raised an evidentiary puzzle
for legal practitioners and scholars: Brandeis submitted factual information
to an appellate court through a brief.31 How could Brandeis introduce the
social science evidence when facts must be established at the trial court
through direct and cross-examination of witnesses?32 Kenneth Culp Davis
provided an answer to this puzzle in a famous law review article that
developed a typology of the different uses of social science in administrative
and judicial decisionmaking.33 Prior to the 1940s, legal authorities recognized
two rough kinds of evidence: adjudicative facts and constitutional facts.34
22
23
24
25
26

FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6).
FED. R. EVID. 201(b).
Id.
208 U.S. 412 (1908).
E.g., John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Judicial Use of Social Science Research, 15 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 571, 572 (1991). In this Section, I focus on federal law and evidentiary practice.
27 208 U.S. at 417.
28 Id. at 419 & n.1.
29 Id. at 420.
30 Id. at 421.
31 Id. at 419.
32 See Monahan & Walker, supra note 26, at 572 (noting that “legal commentators were hard
pressed to explain an apparent anomaly”).
33 Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55
HARV. L. REV. 364, 402-03 (1942). Davis focused on the role of science in administrative
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Parties introduce evidence of adjudicative facts—concerning the actions
or circumstances of immediate relevance to the litigation 35 —through
physical evidence or oral testimony to prove that some legal standard is or is
not satisfied. The prosecution in a murder trial, for example, might introduce evidence that the defendant was apprehended with the blood of the
victim on his hands. This adjudicative fact helps the jury to determine
whether the defendant is guilty.
Legal authorities also recognize a second category of evidence: evidence
introduced to prove constitutional facts.36 Constitutional facts, usually social
or economic statistics, are used not to prove certain facts about the events in
controversy, but to inform the development of a constitutional rule.37 The
Brandeis brief, for example, introduced evidence of facts to justify a constitutional rule that maximum-hour labor restrictions were permissible.38
Davis argued that constitutional facts were “only one manifestation of a
larger category of facts which are utilized for informing a court’s legislative
judgment on questions of law and policy.”39 Courts rely on facts from this
broader category—which Davis called “legislative facts”—to shape not only
constitutional rules, but also legal precedent more generally.40 For example,
though DNA identification is an accepted form of forensic evidence today,
prosecutors were often required to introduce evidence of its reliability to
appellate courts when the technology was first introduced. In United States
v. Porter, the prosecution moved to submit the results of a DNA analysis on
semen collected from the victim and to submit evidence that the probability
of a false match was one in thirty million.41 The court consolidated Porter
with eleven similar cases for a hearing on the reliability of DNA evidence.42
hearings, but his work has been widely extended to factual determinations by courts as well. For
examples of cases in which courts have adopted Davis’s typology of scientific evidence, see infra
note 45 and accompanying text.
34 See Davis, supra note 33, at 403 (“The distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts
apparently has been clearly recognized only in constitutional cases, in which a category of
‘constitutional facts’ has emerged.”).
35 See id. at 402-03. (“When an agency finds facts concerning immediate parties—what the
parties did, what the circumstances were, what the background conditions were—the . . . facts
may conveniently be called adjudicative facts.”).
36 Id. at 403.
37 Id.
38 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419 & n.1 (1908); see also Monahan & Walker, supra note
26, at 572 (“Brandeis assembled a substantial body of medical and social science research tending
to show the debilitating effect on women and girls of working long hours, and presented this
material to . . . defend[] Oregon’s limits on the number of hours females could be employed.”).
39 Davis, supra note 33, at 404.
40 Id. at 402-04.
41 618 A.2d 629, 630 (D.C. 1992).
42 Id.
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After hearing testimony from eight expert witnesses and viewing over 1300
pages of briefing,43 the court held that the results of DNA identification
were admissible, but that mathematical estimates of reliability at the time
were inadmissible for lack of “consensus within the relevant scientific
community.”44
Courts have widely adopted Davis’s distinction between adjudicative and
legislative facts, 45 at least partially because it explains how parties can
submit social science evidence to appellate courts. There are good reasons
for employing different procedures for the admission of adjudicative and
legislative facts. First, stringent procedural requirements on the use of
social science evidence to determine legislative facts would stunt the
development of common law rules. 46 Second, cross-examination is not
necessary in the context of legislative facts because the parties “have little or
nothing to contribute to the development of legislative facts.”47 Courts rely
on legislative facts to develop rules or policies that will apply to all members
of society, and, as such, the parties to a particular case have no unique
interest in the precedent adopted.
Compared to the well-established procedures governing the admission
of adjudicative facts at trial, the rules for legislative facts are less clear.48 In
43
44
45

Id.
Id. at 631.
See, e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11 (1992) (invoking the concept of “legislative
facts” to adjudicate an equal protection claim); Broz v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 1351, 1357 (11th Cir.
1982) (“The legislative/adjudicative fact distinction, first articulated by Professor Davis . . . has
become a cornerstone of modern administrative law theory and has been widely accepted in the
federal appellate courts.”), vacated, Heckler v. Broz, 461 U.S. 952 (1982); State v. Erickson, 574
P.2d 1, 5-6 (Alaska 1978) (stating that the distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts is at
“least implicitly recognized in nearly every situation where a court has been called upon to address
a question of policy in evaluating the rationality or reason behind a statute or rule”); In re
Guardianship of Doyle, 778 N.W.2d 342, 348 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010). The Federal Rules of
Evidence also recognize the distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts. See FED. R.
EVID. 201(a) (specifying that the federal rule for judicial notice applies only to adjudicative facts
and not to legislative facts).
46 Davis wrote:
My opinion is that judge-made law would stop growing if judges, in thinking about
questions of law and policy, were forbidden to take into account the facts they believe, as distinguished from facts which are . . . indisputable. Facts most needed in
thinking about difficult problems of law and policy have a way of being outside the
domain of the clearly indisputable.
Kenneth Culp Davis, A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience, in PERSPECTIVES OF LAW 69, 82 (Roscoe Pound et al. eds., 1964) (internal quotation marks omitted).
47 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, A DMINISTRATIVE L AW T EXT § 7.03 (3d ed. 1972).
48 See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 323 (D.C. 1995) (“[T]he judicial process of finding legislative facts . . . is a difficult and sometimes controversial subject . . . .”
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practice, social science evidence of legislative fact is introduced through
testimony or briefs.49 Courts enjoy wide discretion in obtaining and evaluating legislative facts. First, judges enjoy discretion in the kinds of empirical
materials they can consider. The Federal Rules of Evidence explain that the
judge is “unrestricted in his investigation and conclusion” of relevant
legislative facts, and that he may “reject the propositions of either party, or
of both parties[,] consult the sources of pertinent data to which they refer,
[and] make an independent search of persuasive data[,] or rest content with
what he has or what the parties present.”50 The Federal Rules also permit
appellate judges to abstain from researching legislative facts by remanding
to the trial court for additional factfinding. 51 Second, courts have wide
discretion when determining legislative facts based on the materials available to them. The standard for determining a legislative fact appears to be
preponderance of the evidence.52 And when creating a common law rule, a
court may rely upon the empirical assumptions it finds most “plausible.”53
B. Social Authority
Courts54 and legal scholars55 have questioned the value of the traditional
distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts. Monahan and Walker

(citations omitted)); see also John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining,
Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 485-86 (1986) (noting
that “[n]o positive guidance is provided” to parties on how they should introduce evidence of
legislative fact to a court).
49 Monahan & Walker, supra note 48, at 485-86. For an extended discussion on the lack of
procedural guidance for legislative factfinding, see Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth:
Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1, 43-50 (2011).
50 FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee’s note (quoting Edmund M. Morgan, Judicial
Notice, 57 HARV. L. REV. 269, 270-71 (1944)).
51 Id. (citing Borden’s Farm Prods. Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194 (1934)); see also Arthur
Selwyn Miller & Jerome A. Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the Flow of
Information to the Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REV. 1187, 1233-34 (1975) (recommending that the Supreme Court remand cases for factfinding on a “particular issue of legislative fact”).
52 See, e.g., Dean, 653 A.2d at 329 (“[L]egislative facts must at least appear to be more likely
than not true if the opinion is going to have the requisite intellectual legitimacy upon which the
authority of judge-made rules is ultimately founded.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 331 ( John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992))).
53 Monahan & Walker, supra note 16, at 580. Different rules may apply to legislative factfinding in other contexts. When courts review the constitutionality of legislation, for example,
they often appropriately defer to the empirical assumptions invoked by the legislature in passing
the law. Id. at 583.
54 See, e.g., Bowling v. Dep’t of Ins., 394 So. 2d 165, 174 n.17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (stating
that all facts, whether categorized as legislative or adjudicative, must be substantiated in the same
manner so long as the facts are “reasonably susceptible to some kind of proof ”), abrogated by Ferris
v. Turlington, 510 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1987).
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have proposed “social authority” as an alternative understanding of social
science in the development of legal precedent.56 They observe that unlike
“facts,” which “are specific to particular instances,” both social science and
legal precedent are general in nature. 57 The findings of social science
research derive from particular empirical observations, but those findings
are intended to apply generally to contexts outside of the study.58 Similarly,
although courts develop legal precedent in response to the specific circumstances in the cases before them, precedent will affect future cases as well.59
Noting these similarities between legislative fact and legal precedent,
Monahan and Walker recommend that courts treat social science research as
a kind of authority, as “they would legal precedent under the common
law.”60 An appellate court’s evaluation of a specific study or body of social
science research should control a lower court’s use of that research, just as an
appellate court’s evaluation of case precedent controls a lower court’s use of
that precedent.61
Monahan and Walker’s conception of social authority provides some
general guidance to courts in evaluating social science research in the
process of formulating precedent. They recommend that courts rely upon
social science research that has “survived the critical review of the scientific
community,” and that is based upon valid methodology, generalizable to the
case at hand, and confirmed by a larger body of research.62
C. Social Frameworks
Monahan and Walker have also proposed a second modification to Davis’s
traditional distinction between legislative and adjudicative fact. They argue
that the distinction fails to acknowledge a third frequent use of social

55 See, e.g., Brice McAdoo Clagett, Informal Action—Adjudication—Rule Making: Some Recent
Developments in Federal Administrative Law, 1971 DUKE L.J. 51, 80 (asserting that the classifications
of legislative versus adjudicative facts “alone shed[] very little—if any—light on what procedures
are most appropriate for resolving the issue”).
56 Monahan & Walker, supra note 48, at 488.
57 Id. at 490.
58 Id.
59 See id. at 490-91 (noting that “this attribute of generality . . . is described as the ‘precedential effect’ or authoritative nature of a court decision”).
60 Id. at 488.
61 See id. at 515 (including the caveat that new research and analysis “can change the empirical
conclusions upon which a rule of law rests”).
62 Id. at 499.
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science evidence in courts: social frameworks.63 Unlike adjudicative facts—
which provide specific information about the parties before the court—a
social framework provides “background context” that helps a factfinder
interpret the validity and relevance of adjudicative facts presented before
the court.64
In State v. Chapple, for example, a defendant charged with murder based
on the testimony of two eyewitnesses 65 attempted to introduce expert
testimony that certain characteristics of the identification process decreased
the reliability of the procedure.66 The testimony articulated the results of
recent social science research on reliability issues in eyewitness identification.67 Because the trial court erroneously excluded the majority of the
testimony—“there were a number of substantive issues of ultimate fact on
which the expert’s testimony would have been of significant assistance”68—
the Arizona Supreme Court ordered a retrial.69
The expert testimony in Chapple does not fit cleanly into either the adjudicative fact or legislative fact category. On the one hand, it resembles
testimony on adjudicative facts because it helped the factfinder decide
whether the defendant committed the murder. On the other hand, the
testimony differs from adjudicative fact because the underlying research was
purely general and applied to all criminal cases involving eyewitness
identification. This generality manifests a marked similarity with legislative
fact, but the testimony was introduced to adjudicate the facts of the particular
case, not to develop law. Thus, the social science evidence on eyewitness
reliability in Chapple fits into neither of the two traditional categories. The
concept of social frameworks fills the gap: it explains how general social
science evidence can clarify the adjudicative facts for the factfinder, even
where the parties “accept the state of the law.”70
63 See Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in
Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 568-70 (1987) (discussing the shortcomings of the legislative–adjudicative
fact dichotomy and proposing “social frameworks” as a third category).
64 See id. at 559 (defining a social framework as one “used to construct a frame of reference or
background context for deciding factual issues crucial to the resolution of a specific case”).
65 660 P.2d 1208, 1212 (Ariz. 1983) (noting that the two eyewitnesses had never met the defendant prior to the incident and picked him out of a lineup over a year later).
66 See id. at 1213-18 (recounting defense’s arguments regarding time interval, perception, and
unconscious transfer, among others).
67 Id. at 1218; see generally Gary L. Wells & Donna M. Murray, What Can Psychology Say About
the Neil v. Biggers Criteria for Judging Eyewitness Accuracy?, 68 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 347 (1983)
(discussing the results of social science research on the reliability of eyewitness identification at
the time that Chapple was decided).
68 Chapple, 660 P.2d at 1224.
69 Id. at 1226.
70 See Monahan & Walker, supra note 16, at 570-71.
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Facts, then, fall into one of three categories.71 First, adjudicative facts
are facts introduced to prove a factual issue that is specific only to the case
at hand. Second, social frameworks are general facts applicable to a wide
range of cases that assist factfinders in interpreting case-specific facts.72
Third, legislative facts (or social authority) are general facts introduced to
formulate and justify legal precedent. The category into which particular
evidence fits depends on (1) the purpose for which it is introduced and (2)
its level of generality.
II. LIMITATIONS ON INDIVIDUAL SOCIAL SCIENCE STUDIES,
LIMITATIONS ON HUMAN INTUITION
Scholars and litigants have frequently argued that social science should
not form the basis for judicial decisions in particular cases. I begin this Part
by considering four common kinds of objections to social science on the basis
of methodological flaws. I then consider a different kind of objection, that
the findings of social science studies are inaccurate due to the biases of
researchers. I observe that each of these problems appears to resurface even
if the court declines to employ social science evidence to resolve a question
of common law precedent. Under those circumstances, the judge must rely
instead on his or her own empirical intuitions formed through a process
subject to the same set of limitations.
A. Methodological Limitations
1. Imprecise Data
Scholars and litigants frequently argue that social science studies rely
upon imprecise data that are subject to many sources of error. These errors
include, among others, dishonest survey responses, 73 memory failure, 74
71
72

Id.
This assertion is, in some sense, a simplification of Monahan and Walker’s view of social
frameworks. Though they acknowledge that “[s]ocial science used as a social framework is now
almost always introduced in court . . . as an ‘adjudicative fact,’” Walker & Monahan, supra note
63, at 583, they argue that courts should consider treating social frameworks as having properties
of social authority in some cases, see id. at 587-92.
73 Researchers have observed, for example, that respondents often underreport stigmatized
information about their personal background, such as criminal history. See David S. Kirk,
Examining the Divergence Across Self-Report and Official Data Sources on Inferences About the Adolescent
Life-Course of Crime, 22 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 107, 110 (2006) (discussing prior studies
finding that a substantial fraction of subjects did not report that they had a police record).
74 See, e.g., Daniel L. Schacter, The Seven Sins of Memory: Insights from Psychology and Cognitive
Neuroscience, 182 AM. PSYCHOL. 182, 184 (1999) (discussing psychological research on the process
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temporal variability, 75 indirect measurements of unobservable objects of
study,76 selective reporting,77 coding error,78 interrater reliability problems,79
and unrealistic measurement conditions.80 Data error can certainly limit the
validity of an empirical study, but not all forms of error will bias the results.
In a study of the causal effect of one variable on another, for example,
random measurement errors on the latter (dependent) variable generally do
not bias causal estimates.81
of forgetting); id. at 191-92 (discussing two cognitive processes, suggestibility and bias, which
distort human memory).
75 See, e.g., Martha L. Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal Policymaking: Custody Determinations at Divorce, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 107, 131 (noting the superiority of
repeated-interview over single-interview research designs).
76 Thomas v. Allen, 614 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1268-69 (N.D. Ala. 2009) (discussing error inherent
in measurements of intelligence, which is indirectly measured through respondents’ answers to
verbal and mathematical questions).
77 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 202 n.14 (1976) (“The very social stereotypes that
find reflection in age-differential laws . . . are likely substantially to distort the accuracy of [arrest
statistics on drinking and driving]. Hence ‘reckless’ young men who drink and drive are transformed into arrest statistics, whereas their female counterparts are chivalrously escorted home.”
(citation omitted)).
78 See Brief for Respondent at 16-18, McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (No. 84-6811),
1986 WL 727361 (arguing that the questionnaires used to collect data for a social science study on
capital punishment were coded incorrectly into the database).
79 See id. at 18 (arguing that “differences in judgment among the coders” led to inconsistent
survey data). When two different people code the same raw data, it is possible for them to code
the data differently. Measures of interrater reliability indicate how similarly they code the same
data. See Howard E. A. Tinsley & David J. Weiss, Interrater Reliability and Agreement of Subjective
Judgments, 22 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 358, 359 (1975) (“Interrater reliability . . . represents
the degree to which the ratings of different judges are proportional when expressed as deviations
from their means.”).
80 Laboratory studies on jury behavior are frequently criticized for lacking realism. See, e.g.,
Brief of Petitioner at 7-8, Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986) (No. 84-1865), 1985 WL 669160
(arguing that social science studies of jury behavior in laboratory settings are unreliable because
“evidence is deficient to show that the attitudes of laboratory subjects can predict the behavior of
real juries”); Wayne Weiten & Shari Seidman Diamond, A Critical Review of the Jury Simulation
Paradigm: The Case of Defendant Characteristics, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 71, 83 (1979) (“[E]xtreme
caution should be exercised in extrapolating from present jury simulation research to the
courtroom.”). Studies on the reliability of eyewitness identification have been criticized on similar
grounds. See, e.g., Roy S. Malpass & Patricia G. Devine, Realism and Eyewitness Identification
Research, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 347, 348 (1981) (noting that the “the empirical base” of the
eyewitness identification literature as of 1981 derived from studies that “only remotely reflect the
conditions experienced by witnesses to actual criminal events”); Gary L. Wells, What Do We Know
About Eyewitness Identification?, 48 AM. PSYCHOL. 553, 555 (1993) (“Critics will always contend
that real eyewitnesses are better or worse or somehow different than the people used in eyewitness
experiments. Critics also might charge that eyewitnesses in experiments are not as cautious about
their identification decisions because there is no actual consequence to the falsely identified
person.”).
81 Random measurement error in the dependent variable “leave[s] most of the basic regression results intact,” but inflates the standard errors of the coefficients. RICHARD A. BERK,
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Perhaps more to the point, judges’ empirical intuition unguided by systematic data suffers from similar, and in some cases, more severe error.
Without systematic data, judges must rely upon their own personal experiences or the personal experiences related to them by others. Error may
enter this form of nonsystematic data in two distinct stages. First, personal
or anecdotal data must in the first instance be “perceived,” or “collected,” a
process subject to many of the same vagaries as systematic data collection
efforts. A brief reflection on the admittedly incomplete enumeration of
error in social science demonstrates this. When gathering personal or
anecdotal data on a legally relevant characteristic of human behavior, for
example, people may lie or dissemble, and their behavior may vary over
time depending on when they are observed. Moreover, directly unobservable
social phenomena that are difficult to measure in social science research—
e.g., intelligence,82 social maturity,83 susceptibility to peer pressure,84 or the
true rate of criminal offending85—are likely no easier to perceive accurately
through personal or anecdotal experience.
Second, unlike systematically collected data, which can be preserved
electronically with great fidelity, extensive psychological research has shown
that the accuracy of human memory erodes over time. Individuals can
forget certain details of a past experience or even the experience in its
entirety.86 Accurate memories can also be distorted through a number of different processes. First, the presentation of misleading or false information at
a later time can distort otherwise accurate memory.87 Second, an individual’s
REGRESSION ANALYSIS: A CONSTRUCTIVE CRITIQUE 73 (2004). Random measurement error
on the independent variable, however, can result in bias. Id. at 74. Nonrandom or “systematic”
error on either the independent or dependent variable can also bias the results. Id. at 73.
82 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
83 See Lawrence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature than Adults?: Minors’ Access to
Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the APA “Flip-Flop,” 64 AM. PSYCHOL. 583, 583 (2009)
(discussing the significance of the comparative maturity of adolescents and adults in the Supreme
Court jurisprudence on the administration of the death penalty for juveniles); id. at 588 (describing
a method of indirectly measuring maturity by asking subjects questions about their perception of
the risk associated with certain activities).
84 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580, 593-94 (1992) (considering psychological research
on adolescents’ susceptibility to peer pressure in deciding “whether including clerical members
who offer prayers as part of the official school graduation ceremony is consistent with the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment”).
85 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 202 n.14 (1976) (discussing the difficulty of accurately
measuring the relative rate of drunk driving among men and women due to selective arresting).
86 See Schacter, supra note 74, at 184 (discussing the phenomena of the “transience” of
memory and the process of gradual forgetting).
87 See id. at 191-92 (describing a series of psychological studies in which research subjects
“remembered” details of personal experiences that never happened after they were informed that
members of their family remembered the event).
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confidence that an event took place in the past can be influenced simply by
whether the person has imagined the event in his or her mind.88 Third, an
individual’s current knowledge, beliefs, and expectations can also influence
memory.89 Indeed, psychologists have observed that memory is subject to a
consistency bias through which individuals’ current attitudes color their
recollection of prior perceptions and incidents. 90 Finally, individuals
frequently forget or misattribute the sources of particular facts and experiences.91 Thus, where judges lack relevant personal experience, they may rely
on unreliable sources of data—or perhaps even fictional data from popular
culture—in drawing conclusions about complex questions of empirical fact. 92
Concerns about error in social science data may not, on their own, provide sufficient reason to ignore social science evidence in deciding an issue
of common law precedent. At least where judges cannot circumvent the
need to take sides on the empirical issue,93 these same concerns about error
seem to reappear even if the court ignores the relevant social science
research.
2. Nonrandom Sampling Designs
Scholars and litigants have also argued that social science research often
employs weak sampling methods.94 A sampling design defines the rules by
which individuals are selected for inclusion in a study. Ideally, subjects are

88 See Maryanne Garry et al., Imagination Inflation: Imagining a Childhood Event Inflates Confidence
That It Occurred, 3 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 208, 213 (1996) (“[I]magining a self-reported
counterfactual event increased confidence that the event did happen.”).
89 See Schacter, supra note 74, at 193-94 (describing the results of a series of psychological
studies establishing the consistency bias).
90 Id.
91 See id. at 188 (discussing psychological research which shows that “people may remember
correctly an item or fact from a past experience but misattribute the fact to an incorrect source”).
92 For an extended and generally accessible treatment of the limitations on intuition and reasoning in decisionmaking, see generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).
93 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
94 See, e.g., Brief of Leon R. Kass, Harvey C. Mansfield & The Institute for Marriage and
Public Policy as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 19, Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144
(U.S. Jan. 29, 2013), 2013 WL 416200 (attacking the “nonrepresentative samples” used in studies
cited by an opposing brief to show that “a significant fraction of gay men and lesbians are or have
been in a ‘committed relationship’”); Faigman, supra note 13, at 1060 (“Research programs . . .
using sample[s] . . . bearing little or no resemblance to the population of interest to the law
possess little legal relevance.”); see also Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650-52
(1989) (rejecting the relevance of a data analysis in an employment discrimination case because it
was based upon a sample of individuals that did not represent the pool of qualified job applicants).
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sampled randomly so they represent the wider population of interest.95 But,
in many cases, social scientists must rely upon less rigorous sampling
designs.
In convenience sampling, for example, subjects are selected because of
their proximity and availability to the researcher.96 Convenience sampling
thus provides no rigorous assurance that the sample will represent the
population of interest.97
Convenience and other forms of nonrandom sampling pose important
methodological limitations, but two observations mitigate the risks. First, nonrandom sampling methods do not always bias a study’s result.98 Second,
even where researchers rely on nonrandom sampling, they should describe the
processes by which subjects were obtained and entered into the sample.99
The same kind of transparency is not available where courts draw empirical
judgments based only on intuition and personal experience.
Perhaps more importantly, the problems associated with nonrandom
sampling resurface even if the court chooses to ignore the relevant social
science study in resolving a question of common law precedent that involves
controversial empirical assumptions. Drawing empirical conclusions without
the assistance of social science evidence itself leads to sampling problems.
The totality of a judge’s personal experiences and the personal experiences
of those nearby may form a small and highly selective sample of data that
represents only a small cross section of the upper tiers of society. Moreover,
judges’ perceptions of the frequency or risk of specific events may also be
distorted by the relative frequency with which particular events are discussed among members of the public, or reported in the media.100

95 See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 110 (2002)
(“[R]andom selection is the only selection mechanism . . . that automatically guarantees the
absence of selection bias.” (emphasis omitted)).
96 Id. at 105.
97 Id. at 110.
98 See id. at 106 (noting that the primary concern with nonrandom sampling methods is when
observations are selected “such that those items that somehow make their way into the [sample]
are correlated with the dependent variable (Y ), even after taking into account the explanatory
variable (X )”).
99 Id. at 103 (asserting that researchers should collect “information about the process by
which the data come to be observed”).
100 See KAHNEMAN, supra note 92, at 138 (noting that our perception of the frequency of
certain events is “warped by media coverage” and explaining that “[u]nusual events . . . attract
disproportionate attention and are consequently perceived as less unusual than they really are”).
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3. Unreported Data Mining
Critics have noted that social science findings are sometimes the result
of disingenuous forms of data mining.101 Scientists typically collect and
analyze data from a subset of the overall population. As a result, they must
conduct statistical hypothesis tests to determine whether patterns observed
in the sample can be inferred to apply to the total population. The power of
statistical hypothesis tests to protect against detecting spurious statistical
relationships, however, decreases as the number of tests increases.102 Thus, a
scientist who conducts a large number of statistical tests without reporting
that information can produce misleading findings. Selective data reporting
is even more problematic where a researcher conducts a large number of
statistical tests and presents only those results that are consistent with the
researcher’s preferred theory.103
Unreported or disingenuous forms of data mining certainly undermine
the evidentiary value of individual empirical studies. Social scientists have a
professional and personal incentive to falsify existing theory in their fields.
The scientific value of replication provides at least some protection against
spurious results arrived at through undisclosed data mining. The results of
prior studies are often subjected to further testing by other researchers
who—assuming they do not engage in the same practices—are unlikely to
replicate the results.104

101 See, e.g., Greeley, supra note 14, at 50 (“[O]ne can . . . play a thousand different mathematical games with the data and finally tease out something which may be in accordance with one’s
own ideology.”).
102 See Juliet Popper Shaffer, Multiple Hypothesis Testing, 46 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 561, 562
(1995) (“[W]hen many hypotheses are tested, and each test has a specified Type I error probability,
the probability that at least some Type I errors are committed increases, often sharply, with the
number of hypotheses.”).
103 See, e.g., Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844, 859 (D.D.C. 1971) (rejecting the social
science evidence presented before the court because the studies were “tainted by a vice well known
in the statistical trade—data shopping and scanning to reach a preconceived result”). Concerningly,
this kind of improper scientific practice need not be intentional. Greiner explains,

Model-checking is typically a multi-stage process: the analyst implements a first
model, assesses fit, is less than perfectly satisfied, implements a second model, assesses
fit, compares the fit of the first model to that of the second, implements a third, etc.
A model’s fit is never perfect. At each stage of this process of exploration and assessment, the substantive result, the litigation answer, stares the analyst in the face.
Only the superhuman can completely disregard the temptation to lean towards a result
favorable to a chosen side, consciously or no.
D. James Greiner, Causal Inference in Civil Rights Litigation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 533, 544 (2008)
(footnotes omitted).
104 Thomas C. Leonard elaborates on the self-correction of the social sciences:
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4. Correlation and Causation
Social science explores questions of causation, but often produces only
evidence of correlation.105 Litigants frequently argue,106 for example, that
the empirical evidence presented by an opposing party suffers from what
social scientists call omitted variable bias.107 Omitted variable bias arises
when a study fails to control for a relevant variable that is correlated with
Because it helps promote replication, rivalry in science works to help eliminate error
in a kind of self-correcting fashion. Errors get exposed not because scientists disinterestedly refute their own pet theories, but because their interested rivals have
partisan incentives to do so. Moreover, interested rivals are generally the most qualified reviewers. Those with the greatest incentive to criticize are also those with the
greatest expertise.
Thomas C. Leonard, Reflection on Rules in Science: An Invisible-Hand Perspective, 9 J. ECON.
METHODOLOGY 141, 159 (2002). Admittedly, the process of publication can move slowly;
therefore, it may take time for such errors to be corrected.
105 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights—The Consequences of
Uncertainty, 6 J.L. & EDUC. 3, 5 (1977) (“While in physics it is now thought to be an unsound
judgment that rests merely on correlation between observable events unsupported by some notion
of the mechanics that translate the cause to the effect, social science usually is only able to provide
correlations without the mechanics.”); cf. Fineman & Opie, supra note 75, at 131 (discussing, with a
focus on child custody literature, the failure of studies to control for the “multitude of variables”
that might be the true cause of, or might contribute to, the problem at hand).
106 See, e.g., Brief for the United States at 39, Peugh v. United States, No. 12-62 (U.S. Jan. 25,
2013), 2013 WL 315237 (arguing that the petitioner “mistakes correlation for causation” by
concluding that the federal sentencing guidelines have “a legally binding effect” on the basis of a
“correlation between the sentences judges impose and the ranges that the Guidelines recommend”
(quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 94 n.4 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Brief
of Empirical Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 21-22, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex.
at Austin, No. 11-345 (U.S. Aug. 13, 2012), 2012 WL 3418837 (arguing that the empirical research
cited by the opposing party to support the mismatch theory of affirmative action “violates the
[research] principle of creating groups that are comparable in all pre-existing respects except for
law-school tier”); Brief for Respondent, supra note 78, at 16 (criticizing the lack of methodological
rigor of a social science study—introduced by the opposing party to prove the presence of racial
discrimination in a death penalty case—by arguing that the statistical analysis “fails to include
appropriate variables [and] fails to utilize interaction variables”); Defendant-Appellant Standard
Federal Bank’s Opposition to Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Second Motion to Supplement Record at 1, 19
n.27, Glover v. Standard Fed. Bank, 283 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 2002) (No. 00-3611MNMI), 2001 WL
35902533 (opposing a motion to supplement the appellate record with an expert social science
report and arguing that the report’s statistical analyses omitted important variables); see also, e.g.,
Eastland v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 704 F.2d 613, 622 (11th Cir. 1983) (noting that a party argued that
the court should accord little weight to a regression analysis in resolving an employment
discrimination case because it “failed to control for job category”).
107 If any omitted variables are “correlated with any of the regressors,” we “cannot expect [the
regression analysis] to consistently estimate any” of the parameters in the model. JEFFREY M.
WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION AND PANEL DATA 66 (2d ed.
2010). In multivariate linear regression, for example, omitted variable bias arises when a study fails
to control for a relevant variable that is correlated with one or more of the variables included in
the model. Id. at 54-55.

2013]

Social Science and Judicial Precedent

1427

one or more of the variables included in the model.108 The omission results
in causal estimates that are, on average, incorrect. Unfortunately, limits on
data availability as well as limits on our understanding of underlying causal
phenomena mean that all relevant variables cannot always be included in an
empirical study. In effect, correlations observed between variables may not
represent causation.
Omitted variable bias is an important concern, but the use of methodological tools that address this challenge has increased in recent decades. It is
well known, for example, that experiments can eliminate the risk of omitted
variable bias through randomization.109 Additionally, researchers may sometimes use other methods like instrumental variable analysis110 and regression
discontinuity111 to decrease bias in estimates of causal relations. A number of
other common analytic methods to reduce the risks of omitted variable bias are
also available.112 Finally, in cases where the possibility of omitted variable
bias cannot be ruled out, some statistical procedures enable direct assessment
of the likelihood that a causal estimate is merely the result of bias.113
Even if specific social science studies suffer from omitted variable bias, it
is unclear whether judges facing complex empirical questions fare any better
when they decline to rely on social science evidence in resolving questions
of common law precedent. Indeed, generalizations inferred from anecdotal
data at judges’ disposal are similarly limited by the possibility of mistaking
correlation for causation. Moreover, research comparing the accuracy of
clinical prediction114 versus statistical prediction bears this out. Numerous
studies have demonstrated that both laypersons and experts are substantially
108
109

Id. at 54-55.
See generally Joshua D. Angrist & Alan B. Krueger, Instrumental Variables and the Search for
Identification: From Supply and Demand to Natural Experiments, J. ECON. P ERSP., Fall 2001, at 72.
110 See id. at 69, 72-77.
111 Guido W. Imbens & Thomas Lemieux, Regression Discontinuity Designs: A Guide to Practice,
142 J. ECONOMETRICS 615, 616 (2008).
112 For instance, estimating random or fixed effects on panel data solves the problem of omitted
variable bias for variables that remain fixed over time, such as intelligence or genetic makeup. See
WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 107, at 281-87.
113 For example, sensitivity analyses can assess the likelihood that bias is responsible for the
results of an analysis produced through propensity score matching. See Paul R. Rosenbaum,
Sensitivity Analysis for Certain Permutation Inferences in Matched Observational Studies, 74 BIOMETRIKA
13, 13, 15-17 (1987) (describing a “sensitivity analysis” which measures “the extent to which
inferences about a treatment effect vary over a range of plausible assumptions about unmeasured
pretreatment differences”).
114 A judge’s prediction is akin to what has been referred to as “clinical judgment.” See William
M. Grove et al., Clinical Versus Mechanical Prediction: A Meta-Analysis, 12 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 19, 19 (2000) (“Clinical judgment refers to the typical procedure long used by applied
psychologists and physicians, in which the judge puts data together using informal, subjective
methods.” (emphasis omitted)).
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worse than statistical models at predicting a wide range of human behaviors,
including violence, job performance, marital satisfaction, and psychological
outcomes.115
Thus, concern about the rigor of causal inference in a relevant social
science study may not, on its own, provide sufficient reason to ignore the
study in deciding an issue of precedent. At least where judges cannot
circumvent the need to take sides on the empirical issue, the same concerns
about causal inference seem to reappear even if the court ignores the study.
B. The Biases of Social Scientists Distort
the Results of Their Research
Researchers in both the physical and social sciences are subject to personal
and professional pressures that may distort the results of their studies.116
Research findings may, for example, impact a range of interests that include
job security, promotion, salary, and social prestige.117 Scientists may also
have an interest in protecting a viewpoint they have endorsed in prior work.
But researcher bias may be particularly strong in the social sciences, where
empirical findings often have implications for controversial questions of
public policy.118
Scholars and litigants have argued against the use of social science research
in judicial adjudication because cultural or ideological bias may distort
empirical findings.119 They have argued, for example, that bias enters the
115 See, e.g., id. at 22 tbl.1; Robyn M. Dawes et al., Clinical Versus Actuarial Judgment, 243 SCIENCE
1668, 1669 (1989) (reporting that virtually all of the 100 studies reviewed found that statistical
models provided better predictions than trained clinicians).
116 See Raymond E. Spier, On Dealing with Bias, 8 SCI. & ENGINEERING ETHICS 483, 483
(2002) (providing an extensive list of incentives that may bias the results of researchers’ findings).
117 Id.
118 See, e.g., Ann Woolhander, Rethinking the Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 VAND. L.
REV. 111, 119 (1988) (“One’s beliefs about causation are closely tied to one’s beliefs about desirable
effects. . . . [I]f one sees a racially integrated society as a desirable end, one may also view the
current segregated society as resulting from forces other than individual merit. A view that racial
integration is undesirable frequently accompanies a view that individual merit is a strong causative
factor in the current segregation of society.”).
119 See, e.g., Brief of Leon R. Kass, et al., supra note 94, at 2 (disputing the existence of a
“scientific basis for constitutionalizing same-sex marriage” by arguing that existing social science
studies on the topic are “shaped and driven by politics and ideology”); Brief of Amicus Curiae
Comic Book Legal Defense Fund in Support of Respondents at 17, Brown v. Entm’t Merchs.
Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (No. 08-1448), 2010 WL 3697188 (asserting that “social science can do
great damage when it is ‘weak in methodology, but strong in ideology’” (quoting Christopher J.
Ferguson & Cheryl K. Olson, The Supreme Court and Video Game Violence: Will Regulation Be Worth
the Costs to the First Amendment?, CRIMINOLOGIST (Am. Soc’y of Criminology, Columbus, Ohio),
July/Aug. 2010, at 18, 20)); Faigman, supra note 13, at 1026-27 (noting the “often repeated criticism”
that “social scientists’ values affect the kinds of research done and, at least indirectly, the findings
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research process in the selection of issues and research questions, and in the
collection of data.120 “[I]nevitable bias” in the underlying methodology of
these studies may undermine the description of any findings as “neutral
‘facts.’”121 Social scientists’ preconceived assumptions about the world may
also influence how they interpret their data.122
Of course, there is little reason to suspect that social scientists are the
only individuals whose empirical judgments are subject to bias. Two areas of
research provide some insight on bias among judges.
First, legal scholars have closely examined the relationship between ideology and judicial decisionmaking. 123 Early studies reported a “profound
partisan effect”124 of political ideology125 on judicial decisions in environmental and administrative law cases. For instance, an analysis of industry
procedural challenges to decisions by the Environmental Protection Agency
found that the “reversal rate for panels with two Democrats and one
Republican ranges between 2% and 13%, whereas for panels with two
Republicans and one Democrat the reversal rate ranges from 54% to
of that research”); Fineman & Opie, supra note 75, at 110, 126-27 (“[L]egal uses of social science
literature, designated as objective, neutral, and scientific uses of objective, neutral, and scientific
facts, may ‘in fact’ be inherently political and/or ideological statements, which are shielded and
obscured by the scientific mantle in which they are wrapped.”); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 14, at
158 (“All social science studies may be biased by the investigators’ methodology, theory, prejudices,
or funding.”).
120 See Fineman & Opie, supra note 75, at 126 (“Bias enters the selection of the issue to be
examined, the questions asked in the examination, and the compilation of the data.”); id. at 130
(“The data can never be totally separated from the political, personal, and professional opinions of
the person manipulating them.”).
121 See id at 126.
122 See Woolhander, supra note 118, at 119 (“The . . . social scientist asks a question and
interprets data based on a pre-existing hypothesis about causation; this is . . . especially true for
the soft sciences, which typically serve as the source for legislative facts.”); id. at 120 (“Pre-existing
views about the causes of desirable and undesirable effects govern social scientists’ development of
legislative facts . . . .”).
123 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial
Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE
L.J. 2155 (1998); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical
Study, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 775 (2009); Michael A. Perino, Law, Ideology, and Strategy in Judicial
Decision Making: Evidence from Securities Fraud Actions, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 497 (2006);
Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717
(1997); Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic Debates About
Statistical Measures, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 743 (2005).
124 Cross & Tiller, supra note 123, at 2169.
125 In empirical studies of federal courts, a judge’s political ideology is often assumed to
match that of the president who appointed the judge. See Sisk & Heise, supra note 123, at 780
(describing this approach as a “standard practice in empirical study of judicial decisionmaking by
both legal and political science scholars”).
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89%.”126 In a study of D.C. Circuit cases reviewing an issue of administrative law under Chevron, 127 Cross and Tiller estimated that “when the
agency’s policy outcome is consistent with the policy preferences of the
panel’s majority, the court is [31%] more likely to defer than if there is no
such convergence.”128 Methodological criticisms of this area of the research
literature,129 as well as other empirical findings, may have tempered the
theoretical implications drawn on its basis.130
The scholarship described above explores broad questions about the
effects of ideology and policy preference on judicial decisions generally.
These decisions involve a complex array of legal, normative, and empirical
components. Thus, the existing literature on judicial ideology provides only
limited insight on the narrower question of whether courts can draw
specifically empirical judgments without concerns of bias. A second and
emerging literature examines the relationship between values and empirical
perceptions among the general population and addresses the narrower
question of whether individuals can draw specifically empirical judgments
without concerns of bias. Scholars, for example, have found robust correlations between individuals’ cultural values and their perceptions of environmental risks.131 Scholars have also observed substantial correlations between
values and perceptions of the effectiveness of public policies such as gun
regulation, the death penalty, drug criminalization, business regulation, and
abortion.132 Perhaps most relevant here, scholars have found that cultural
values are strongly correlated not only with empirical perception of risks,

126
127

Revesz, supra note 123, at 1763.
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984)
(imposing a deferential standard for Article III courts’ review of administrative agency action).
128 Cross & Tiller, supra note 123, at 2171.
129 See Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV.
1335, 1343-64 (1998) (responding directly to Revesz’s and Cross and Tiller’s works, challenging the
validity of their empirical methods, questioning their interpretation of data, and arguing for an
alternative explanation of their results); Epstein & King, supra note 95, at 87-89, 95-96 (questioning the validity and efficiency of using the party of the President who appointed them as a proxy
for judges’ policy preferences and proposing an alternative method).
130 As one commentator notes, the “growing body of research on the lower federal courts . . .
reveals that ideology explains a relatively modest part of judicial behavior.” Sisk & Heise, supra
note 123, at 746.
131 See, e.g., Karl Dake, Orienting Dispositions in the Perception of Risk: An Analysis of Contemporary
Worldviews and Cultural Biases, 22 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 61, 71 tbl.1 (1991) (correlating
ideological constructs such as egalitarianism and individualism with measures of individuals’
perception of risk on a range of social issues).
132 See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 149, 158-60 (2006) (“Not only did cultural worldviews have the predicted influence on beliefs,
they also explained such beliefs more powerfully than any other individual characteristic . . . .”).
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but also with individuals’ perceptions of the existence of a consensus among
scientific experts with respect to specific issues.133
Dan Kahan and his colleagues have proposed the concept of cultural
cognition to explain the correlations between cultural values and perceptions of empirical fact. Cultural cognition theory posits that group values
influence individuals’ perceptions of empirical facts.134 Its proponents explain
that “[t]he law often requires decisionmakers to infer facts they cannot
directly observe: states of mind, causal links, and the like. In such circumstances, individuals naturally gravitate toward factual perceptions that
reflect their group commitments.”135 Individuals experience some pressure
to “fit their perceptions of how the world does work to their shared appraisals of how the world should work.”136 In the context of empirical facts used to
form policy, “individuals conform their factual beliefs about the efficacy of
policies to the cultural meanings that various policies convey.”137 Cultural
cognition theory therefore provides evidence that the empirical judgments
of everyone—laypeople, judges, and social scientists alike—are subject to
some level of bias when forming empirical judgments about the world.
Certain constraints imposed by the process of scientific research, however,
suggest that social science produces empirical judgments with considerably
lower levels of bias. First, social scientists must rely on systematically
collected data to test empirical hypotheses. Second, they should abide by
the accepted methodological standards of their fields in arriving at their
conclusions, which includes reporting all relevant information necessary to
assess the quality of the study.138 Third, the peer review process in mainstream scientific journals requires that multiple methodological and substantive experts review manuscripts before they are accepted for publication.
This process helps ensure that studies conform to methodological standards
of their respective fields and identify their limitations in print.139 Fourth,

133 See Dan M. Kahan et al., Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus, 14 J. RISK RES. 147, 167
(2011) (“Subjects holding hierarchical and individualistic outlooks . . . and ones holding
egalitarian and communitarian outlooks . . . significantly disagreed about the state of expert
opinion on climate change, nuclear waste disposal, and handgun regulation.”).
134 See Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in
Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 732-33 (2010).
135 Id. at 732.
136 Id.
137 Dan M. Kahan et al., Cultural Cognition and Public Policy: The Case of Outpatient Commitment
Laws, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 118, 121 (2010) (citation omitted).
138 See Epstein & King, supra note 95, at 38 (“Good empirical work adheres to the replication
standard: another researcher should be able to understand, evaluate, build on, and reproduce the
research without any additional information from the author.”).
139 See Leonard, supra note 104, at 157.
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the scientific community places a strong emphasis on the replication of
analyses for new sources of data and by different scholars.140 Results that
generally cannot be replicated should be regarded with skepticism. And
fifth, systematic literature reviews and, more recently, formal meta-analyses
enable the scientific community to pool results across a large number of
studies and, thus, draw more formal and systematic conclusions about a
body of research.141 Together, these features of social science research place
some limits on the potential for researchers’ personal biases to infect the
findings of their work.
Overall, bias appears to enter the judicial process—either through the
biases of the researchers, the judge, or both—regardless of whether a judge
decides to rely upon social science evidence in resolving a question of
common law precedent. However, the use of social science evidence provides
three additional benefits over the use of unguided empirical intuition and
personal experience. First, where significant scientific consensus exists, a
review of the existing social science literature may challenge a judge’s
potentially false perception of the scope of such consensus.142 Most judges,
of course, cannot keep up-to-date on social science research. Therefore, a
review of a specific field prompted by the issues of a particular case will
assist the judge in obtaining a more accurate perception of the current state
of the literature.
Second, the relevant social science literature may persuade a judge that his
own empirical intuition is inaccurate. Interestingly, Kahan and colleagues
have extended cultural cognition theory to explain how expert opinion
influences individuals’ perceptions of empirical facts.143 In one study, the
authors measured “how cultural values influence” the subjects’ perceptions of
the risk associated with the HPV vaccine.144 The authors found that presenting subjects with the opinions of two policy experts—one in favor of
vaccination and one against—increased the subjects’ perception of the risks
relative to the benefits of the vaccine regardless of the subjects’ cultural
background.145 But, they also found that the size of this effect varied by the
140
141
142

See Epstein & King, supra note 95, at 38.
See infra notes 184-90.
See Kahan et al., supra note 133, at 156-69 (finding that a subject’s ideological background
influences his perception of consensus among experts).
143 See Dan M. Kahan et al., Who Fears the HPV Vaccine, Who Doesn’t, and Why? An Experimental Study of the Mechanisms of Cultural Cognition, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 501, 504 (2010)
(hypothesizing that “people will selectively credit or discredit information on risk in a manner that
fits their cultural predispositions toward them” and that cultural affinity determines “whom people
see as knowledgeable, honest, and unbiased”).
144 Id. at 503.
145 See id. at 509 (“[B]eing exposed to arguments raises the perception of risk overall.”).
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subjects’ cultural worldviews and their perception of whether the expert
“share[d] their basic view of how society should be organized.”146 These
findings—though collected through an online survey that provided just a
few sentences of expert opinion on the HPV vaccine—suggest that the
effect of social science research on courts might vary by judge, the substantive
empirical issue, and the background of the experts in the scientific debate.
Third, the explicit use of social science data increases the transparency
of judicial decisions. Though some judges may, therefore, shy away from
social science evidence, more explicit reasoning provides greater opportunity
for a meritorious challenge on appeal or in subsequent cases.147 Judicial
judgments on complex issues of empirical fact that are not based on external
data leave little opportunity for review. “The worth . . . of a study can
almost always be discerned from the methods section.”148 The same cannot
be said of empirical judgments based on personal experience and intuition.
III. A BODY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE STUDIES AND THE
DANGER OF OVERTURNING PRECEDENT
In the previous Part, I focused on limitations on the value of individual
empirical studies for formulating judicial precedent. Here, I consider
limitations that arise when we consider a larger body of research that
focuses on the same empirical question or a host of related questions. I
consider two features of these bodies of research in particular: a small
number of studies and inconsistent findings.
A. Small Literatures
Scientific theory is most reliable when it has been subjected to a large
number of tests in a range of different contexts by a diverse set of researchers.
In some cases, however, the relevant social science literature will be small in
size. Smaller literatures come with an important limitation: a higher risk
that subsequent research will overturn the findings of the existing literature.
146
147

Id. at 512.
Cf. Meares, supra note 12, at 869 (“Empiricism will make criminal justice decisions—
constitutional criminal procedure decisions in particular—more transparent. Adjudication that
expressly and openly discusses the normative judgments at the core of constitutional criminal
procedure is transparent. Reference to relevant social science and empirical data creates transparency because these references ground factual assertions. As a result, interpretive choices are more
clearly reflected. Increased attention to empirical evidence will not guarantee the right answers in
criminal procedure cases, but use of empirical evidence will produce a clearer picture of the
existing constitutional landscape and spotlight the normative judgments at the heart of criminal
procedure cases.”).
148 Faigman, supra note 13, at 1031.

1434

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 161: 1409

Critics of social science have raised the “overturnability” objection in two
forms.
1. Overturning Precedent Due to Changes
in Scientific Understanding
Scholars, and occasionally litigants, have argued that, even though a social fact may remain constant over time, our theoretical understanding of
that phenomenon changes as social scientists publish new studies.149 Thus,
justifying legal policy on the basis of social science theory may require
frequent revisions of existing law in order to stay current with the social
science literature.
This version of the overturnability argument appears misplaced for several reasons. First, the objection assumes that individual studies are definitive and that a given study can, on its own, reverse scientists’ understanding
of complex empirical issues. However, the slow evolution of social science
knowledge sharply limits the need to revise precedent frequently.
Second, even in the unlikely situation in which a body of social science
wobbles back and forth over a short period of time, Monahan and Walker’s
conception of social authority suggests that courts can avoid frequent
revision by importing a kind of stare decisis to the empirical assumptions of
judicial precedent.150 Courts may require that research meet some relevant
threshold before a revision to precedent is warranted. For example, in the
1977 case Manson v. Brathwaite, the Supreme Court held that evidence of an
eyewitness identification is inadmissible if the officer administering the
procedure engaged in “unnecessarily suggestive” behavior, and the procedure rendered the identification unreliable.151 The Court did not appear to
use social science evidence in arriving at this decision,152 but it certainly
relied upon the empirical assumption that the five factors it laid out were
149 Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 167 (1955) (“[S]ince the behavioral
sciences are so very young, imprecise, and changeful, their findings have an uncertain expectancy
of life. Today’s sanguine asseveration may be cancelled by tomorrow’s new revelation—or new
technical fad.”); see also Brief of Amici Curiae, Alabama et al. at 28, Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S.
162 (1986) (No. 84-1865), 1985 WL 669159 (arguing that sociological studies are “inadequate bases
for constitutional decisionmaking even when they have been strong and consistent,” and citing
changes in accepted theory on the deterrent effect of the death penalty as an example).
150 Monahan & Walker, supra note 48, at 488-89 (proposing that “courts treat social science
research as they would legal precedent under the common law”).
151 See 432 U.S. 98, 110-14 (1977).
152 The Court did not cite any social science studies. Furthermore, the psychological literature at the time of the decision had just begun to develop. See Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures and the Supreme Court’s Reliability Test in Light of
Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 1 (2009).
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valid indicators of reliability. Drawing from its decision in Neil v. Biggers,153
the Court established five factors to determine the reliability of the procedure, including “the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the
time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior
description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the
confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation.”154
Since 1977, psychologists have produced a large body of empirical literature
showing that at least three of these five factors are poor indicators of
reliability,155 and that some effective indicators are not acknowledged in
Manson at all.156 But the Supreme Court “has yet to . . . overhaul Manson’s
outdated rule.”157 Though perhaps an extreme and unfortunate example,
ongoing judicial deference to Manson shows that changes in scientific theory
do not necessarily prompt immediate revisions to judicial precedent.
2. Overturning Precedent Due to Changes
in Social Phenomena
Scholars and litigants have also raised a second form of the overturnability
objection by asserting that judicial rules, and especially constitutional rights,
should not be based upon social science data, not merely because our
understanding of the relevant empirical phenomenon changes over time,
but because the phenomenon itself changes.158 In United States v. Peugh, for
153
154
155

409 U.S. 188 (1972).
Manson, 432 U.S. at 114 (citing Neil, 409 U.S. at 199-200).
See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 918 (N.J. 2011) (“[Three of the Manson factors]
rely on self-reporting by eyewitnesses; and research has shown that those reports can be skewed by
the suggestive procedures themselves and thus may not be reliable. . . . [W]hen reports are
tainted by a suggestive process, they become poor measures . . . to bar unreliable evidence.”).
156 See id. at 919 (implying that the Manson standard does not “allow[] judges to consider all
relevant factors that affect reliability”).
157 Timothy P. O’Toole & Giovanna Shay, Manson v. Brathwaite Revisited: Towards a New
Rule of Decision for Due Process Challenges to Eyewitness Identification Procedures, 41 VAL. U. L. REV.
109, 116 (2006). The Supreme Court of New Jersey recently found that the empirical assumptions
of Manson are invalid and thus revised the standard to better reflect current knowledge on the
reliability of eyewitness identification. See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 918-22. Some jurisdictions have
also interpreted state constitutions or statutes to provide greater protection against unreliable
eyewitness identification. See O’Toole & Shay, supra, at 115 (citing Kansas, Massachusetts, New
York, and Utah as examples of jurisdictions with such protections).
158 See Cahn, supra note 149, at 167 (“It is one thing to use the current scientific findings . . .
to ascertain whether the legislature has acted reasonably in adopting some scheme of social or
economic regulation . . . . It would be quite another thing to have our fundamental rights rise,
fall, or change along with the latest fashions of psychological literature.”); David M. O’Brien, Of
Judicial Myths, Motivations and Justifications: A Postscript on Social Science and the Law, 64 JUDICATURE 285, 289 (1981) (questioning whether constitutional rights should depend upon the “latest
public opinion survey”).
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example, the Supreme Court will decide whether the Ex Post Facto Clause
applies to the advisory Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 159 The petitioner
presented data to show the effect of the Guidelines on sentencing.160 The
Solicitor General argued that the Court should ignore this statistical
evidence because basing precedent on the data would “create the possibility
that the Guidelines’ ex post facto status would fluctuate with each new set
of data from the Sentencing Commission.”161 Ronald Dworkin provided a
more general formulation of a similar argument. He wrote that “[c]orrelations of social phenomena are fragile in the sense that the data, the behaviour
[of] which forms the correlation, can change very quickly.”162 He reasoned
that, if the relevant empirical phenomenon changes, then so too must the
rules based upon it.163
Faigman has responded to this overturnability problem by arguing that
it is merely temporary: “[S]ocial science will progress to a point where its
theories will take into account the fluctuations of different variables and be
able to predict outcomes on some well-corroborated theoretical basis.”164
The theory is that, in the future, social science will be sufficiently robust to
account for and predict the changes in underlying sociological patterns with
sufficient accuracy to ensure that these changes will require no legal revisions. This is a tall order, and it is unlikely that any field in the social
sciences will realize this achievement anytime soon.
The stronger counterargument focuses more closely on the logic underlying the alleged problem. Dworkin’s argument strangely neglects the idea
that we care about social science because it informs us of the empirical facts
essential to selecting the right rule. Indeed, when the underlying empirical facts
change, it seems reasonable to change the rule based upon them. This is consistent with the framework the Supreme Court has adopted for overturning
159 See Brief for the United States, supra note 106, at I (defining the question presented as
“[w]hether the Ex Post Facto Clause required the district court to consult the version of the
advisory Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time of petitioner’s offenses, rather than the
version in effect at the time of sentencing, in determining the appropriate sentence”).
160 Brief of Petitioner at 20-31, Peugh v. United States, No. 12-62 (U.S. Dec. 26, 2012), 2012
WL 6755129.
161 Brief for the United States, supra note 106, at 49. At least one of the Justices, Justice Alito,
appeared concerned by this objection at oral argument; he asked whether the case “would . . .
come out differently” in twenty years if it turned out that only a “distinct minority of defendants
are being sentenced within the guidelines.” See Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Peugh v. United
States, No. 12-62 (U.S. Feb. 26, 2013), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/
argument_transcripts/12-62.pdf.
162 Dworkin, supra note 105, at 6.
163 See id. (cautioning against relying on social science when constitutional rights are at issue
because its use would risk unpalatable variability).
164 Faigman, supra note 13, at 1044.
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legal precedent, which considers whether the “facts have so changed . . . as
to have robbed the old rule of . . . justification.”165 Perhaps Dworkin was
concerned about a situation in which the underlying social phenomenon
changes so frequently that the administrative and information costs of
repeatedly updating the rule would outweigh any benefits. If so, he is
correct that, in these extreme situations, we should give up mapping the law
to changes in the underlying empirical phenomena. But such situations are
rare, and for the most part, it is reasonable to presume that the social
phenomena relevant to judicial rulemaking are slow to change.
B. Inconsistent Literatures
Until now, I have assumed that the relevant social science literature is
more or less internally consistent—that is, that studies generally point
towards the same empirical answers. Of course, this assumption is implausible. Litigants often argue that a specific social science literature with
inconsistent findings should not be relied upon in formulating judicial
precedent. 166 In addition to the overturnability concerns discussed
above,167 inconsistent results pose at least two additional limitations on the
development of judicial precedent.
First, in some cases, the findings of a body of empirical literature may
be so inconsistent as to provide no helpful information regarding the
empirical question faced by the court. For example, criminologists and
economists have spent decades exploring the deterrent effect of the death
penalty on crime, an empirical question that has received significant public
attention. 168 In Furman v. Georgia, for example, the Supreme Court
reviewed the constitutionality of the administration of the death penalty.169
In dissent, Justice Powell denied the relevance of the empirical question of
deterrence; he noted, “[L]egislative judgments as to the efficacy of particular

165
166

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992).
See, e.g., Reply Brief for Petitioner at 11, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03633), 2004 WL 2046818 (noting that the opposing party based its argument to revise Supreme
Court precedent on the constitutionality of the death penalty for minors on empirical literature
that has produced “inconsistent” rather than “uniform” findings); Brief of Respondent at 24,
Tucker v. State, 965 A.2d 900 (Md. 2009) (No. 35), 2008 WL 5027087 (arguing that defendants are
not entitled to cross-race jury instructions, at least partially because the results of the empirical
literature on cross-race eyewitness identification are “inconsistent”).
167 See supra subsections III.A.1–2.
168 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Does Death Penalty Save Lives? A New Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
18, 2007, at A1 (describing a renewed academic debate among empirical scholars regarding the
deterrent effect of the death penalty).
169 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
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punishments are presumptively rational.”170 But he also drew the tentative
conclusion that the death penalty exerts greater deterrence than other forms
of punishment.171 In contrast, several concurring opinions placed a heavy
emphasis on whether the death penalty deters. Justice Brennan, for example, asserted that the argument for the death penalty “is not based upon
evidence that the threat of death is a superior deterrent. Indeed, . . . the
available evidence uniformly indicates, although it does not conclusively
prove, that the threat of death has no greater deterrent effect than the threat
of imprisonment.”172 Similarly, Justice Marshall noted that “the question to
be considered is not simply whether capital punishment is a deterrent, but
whether it is a better deterrent than life imprisonment.”173 Observing that
the empirical question is especially difficult to resolve,174 he conducted a
detailed review of the available evidence 175 and concluded that “capital
punishment cannot be justified on the basis of its deterrent effect.”176
Forty years of subsequent research on deterrence has produced little
conclusive evidence. According to a recent National Academy of Sciences
report, the results of this literature vary widely: “Some studies conclude
that executions save large numbers of lives; others conclude that executions
actually increase homicides; and still others conclude that executions have
no effect on homicide rate.”177 These results are “striking” given the “similarity of the data and methods used across studies and the diversity of the
results.”178 To explain the divergent results, the report assesses the validity

170 Id. at 456 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist. Id.; see also id. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“Our constitutional inquiry, however, must be divorced from personal feelings as to the morality and efficacy of
the death penalty, and be confined to the meaning and applicability of the uncertain language of
the Eighth Amendment.”).
171 Id. at 454-55 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“Prima facie the penalty of death is likely to have a
stronger effect as a deterrent to normal human beings than any other form of punishment, and
there is some evidence (though no convincing statistical evidence) that this is in fact so. But this
effect does not operate universally or uniformly, and there are many offenders on whom it is
limited and may often be negligible.” (quoting JAMES CHUTER EDE, HOME SEC’Y, ROYAL
COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1949–1953 REPORT, 1953, [Cmd.] 8932, at 24 (U.K.))).
172 Id. at 301 (Brennan, J., concurring).
173 Id. at 346-47 (Marshall, J., concurring).
174 See id. at 347 (“There is no more complex problem than determining the deterrent efficacy
of the death penalty.”).
175 See id. at 345-54.
176 Id. at 354.
177 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., DETERRENCE AND THE
DEATH PENALTY 1 (Daniel S. Nagin & John V. Pepper eds., 2012).
178 Id. at 47 (emphasis omitted).
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of the statistical methods used in the death penalty literature.179 Ultimately,
the report concludes that several key methodological assumptions underlying
all of the studies are “untenable” and help explain the discrepant findings.180
The report discourages drawing policy judgments based on the death
penalty literature.181 Thus, death penalty research offers an example of a
literature so riddled with inconsistent findings that it may provide no
valuable guidance to courts at all.
Second, other areas of the social science literature contain some inconsistent findings, but still can provide valuable insights for the development
of judicial precedent. The expansive psychological literature on eyewitness
identification, for example, suggests that identification under certain conditions is especially unreliable, but not all studies confirm these findings.182
An inconsistent literature, especially one containing a large number of
studies, poses a special practical challenge for using social science in the
development of judicial precedent. Most judges have little empirical training. Though some legal scholars have argued that many judges are nonetheless capable of critically assessing an empirical literature, 183 courts have

179 See id. at 47-48 (“Given this diversity of results across and in some cases within studies, a
central task for this committee is to assess the validity of the models used in the studies.”); see also
id. at 54 (“In light of the variability in the estimated effects of the death penalty on homicide, a
central question is whether the correct specification is being used and can be identified.”).
180 Id. at 71.
181 Id. at 102 (“The committee concludes that research to date on the effect of capital punishment on homicide is not informative about whether capital punishment decreases, increases, or
has no effect on homicide rates. Therefore, the committee recommends that these studies not be
used to inform deliberations requiring judgments about the effect of the death penalty on
homicide.” (emphasis omitted)).
182 See Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of the Effects of High Stress on
Eyewitness Memory, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 687, 694, 695 tbl.1 (2004) (showing that most,
though not all, studies examining the effect of stress on the reliability of eyewitness identification
find that stress decreases the reliability); see also State v. Marquez, 967 A.2d 56, 77 (Conn. 2009)
(noting that the “judgment of the relevant scientific community with respect to eyewitness
identification procedures is far from universal”).
183 See, e.g., Beecher-Monas, supra note 14, at 72 (noting in a discussion of the admissibility of
scientific evidence that “judges can indeed learn to think like scientists, at least insofar as being
able to recognize faulty logic when they hear it”); Faigman, supra note 2, at 604 (contending that
“[e]mpirical research is simply not that difficult to understand” and that “the [Supreme] Court has
repeatedly demonstrated the aptitude to use statistical data as well as to understand the essence of
the scientific method” (footnote omitted)); Lochner, supra note 14, at 826-27 (“[T]he methodology
of the social sciences [is not] impossible to understand . . . . Although a good deal of social
science methodology is difficult to grasp—statistical testing, for example—even these subjects can
be mastered with some effort. . . . [T]he social scientist’s work may be different in some respects
from the attorney’s work, but it is surely not beyond his comprehension.”); Monahan & Walker,
supra note 48, at 511 n.119 (“Acquiring the knowledge of social science necessary to evaluate most
research studies is no more difficult than acquiring the knowledge of economics necessary to
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expressed at least some difficulty in doing so. 184 And this challenge is
nowhere greater than in the case of large and inconsistent literatures.
A number of common tools are available to help courts grapple with
these kinds of complex social science literatures. First, scholars often
publish systematic reviews in which the author collects all existing empirical
studies on a particular research question, assesses their methodological
validity, and draws conclusions about the strength of the findings with
respect to a set of relevant hypotheses.185 Scholars may sometimes conduct a
more formal review of the literature through meta-analysis, a quantitative
methodology that pools the results of multiple studies together to draw
mathematical estimates about the distribution of the statistic of interest
across studies.186 Particularly for controversial or politically charged research
areas, it can be helpful for a trusted and nonpartisan organization to perform the review. For example, the National Academy of Sciences, the
preeminent authority on scientific research in the United States, 187 has
commissioned reports on a range of empirical questions of legal interest,
including those on the deterrent effect of the death penalty,188 the effect of
guns on crime,189 and the reliability of forensic sciences.190
One valuable benefit of published academic reviews that have undergone
a peer review process is their scalability: if these reports are credible, courts
across the country can rely upon the same report to guide their legislative
factfinding. On the other hand, courts may sometimes face a new empirical
question for which no review of the literature is yet available. In most cases,
adjudicate many antitrust cases . . . . Anyone who can comprehend the Federal Tort Claims Act
can learn what standard deviation and statistical significance mean.”).
184 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (“It is unrealistic to expect . . . members
of the judiciary . . . to be well versed in the rigors of experimental or statistical technique.”);
Vuyanich v. Republic Nat’l Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 258-59 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (asserting
that courts lack “technical competence” to go beyond assessing the validity of “mathematical and
statistical techniques”), vacated, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1984).
185 See A.K. Akobeng, Evidence Based Child Health 3: Understanding Systematic Reviews and
Meta-Analysis, 90 ARCHIVE DISEASE CHILDHOOD 845, 845 (2005) (noting that a systematic
review involves “a comprehensive, exhaustive search for primary studies on a focused clinical
question, selection of studies using clear and reproducible eligibility criteria, critical appraisal of
primary studies for quality, and synthesis of results”).
186 Id. at 845-46.
187 See What We Do, NAT’L ACADS., http://www.nas.edu/about/whatwedo/index.html (last
visited Feb. 4, 2013) (describing the purpose and status of the organization).
188 See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
189 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: A
CRITICAL REVIEW (Charles F. Wellford et al. eds., 2005).
190 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., S TRENGTHENING FORENSIC
SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES : A PATH FORWARD (2009) [hereinafter STRENGTHENING
FORENSIC SCIENCE].
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the traditional outlets of academic publication will not be able to respond in
time to assist the court. The peer review and editorial process required by
academic journals can take many months, and large reports by the National
Academy of Sciences can take several years.191
Second, subject matter experts and research organizations can also provide guidance to courts on complex empirical literatures through amicus
curiae briefs.192 Amicus briefs are more responsive to the immediate needs
of courts as they can be researched, written, and filed within a shorter
period of time than academic publications.193 Of course, the streamlined
process for submitting amicus briefs comes at a cost: without an oversight
mechanism such as peer review, the briefs come with a higher risk of false or
distorted representations of the empirical literature.194 This risk is especially
concerning given the increasing “open partisanship” of amicus briefs in
recent years.195 Some scholars have argued that professional social science
associations should serve as “neutral expert amici” without advocating for a
particular party. These “neutral” amicus briefs might provide courts with
more reliable empirical guidance.196 Of course, purportedly “neutral” amici
may submit briefs that do not present a neutral discussion of the relevant
scientific literature. Judges might encourage a stronger neutral commitment
to the court by reaching out to a specific scientific expert or group of
experts to serve as court-appointed amici in a particular case.
Third, a court can retain independent social science experts to review
complex empirical literature and provide guidance to the court.197 Scholars

191 For example, the federal government provided funding for the National Academy of Sciences to research and publish a report on the state of the forensic sciences in the United States in
2006. See NIJ Awards in FY 2006 by Solicitation, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE (Nov. 30, 2007),
http://www.nij.gov/nij/funding/awards/2006_solicitation.htm. The report was published in 2009,
three years later. STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 190.
192 See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 14, at 94 (“The most common method of introducing
social science evidence to the [Supreme] Court is through . . . amicus curiae briefs.”).
193 The Supreme Court, for example, imposes several different deadlines for amicus briefs,
none of which exceeds sixty days. See SUP. CT. R. 37(2)(a).
194 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 14, at 143-51 (describing the various ways in which partisan
amicus curiae can provide a distorted representation of the research literature in order to advance
their interests).
195 Id. at 96-97.
196 Id. at 153 (“Professional social science associations are a natural source for the neutral
expertise the Court needs to assess competing social science claims. These organizations could be
requested to file amicus curiae briefs in support of neither party to assist the Court.”).
197 Under some circumstances, the use of independent social science experts might constitute
a form of information flow to the court that could “sap the integrity and morale of the formal
adversary system.” Miller & Barron, supra note 51, at 1189. One common proposal is for the court
to notify the parties of social science evidence it is considering in resolving an issue of legislative
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have proposed a variety of arrangements varying in scope and feasibility.
Kenneth Culp Davis, for example, has argued that the Supreme Court
should establish a permanent institution to serve as a research arm to the
Court.198 Perhaps less ambitiously, others have recommended that courts
appoint a “panel of resident social scientists” to serve on a permanent
basis.199 Unless social scientists are willing to perform this work without pay,
these proposals seem unrealistic, particularly for courts at lower levels of the
judiciary.
Perhaps a more realistic strategy for lower courts would prioritize hiring
one or more permanent staff attorneys with a background in empirical
methods.200 All federal courts of appeals and some federal district courts
and state courts employ staff attorneys who serve as clerks for the court as a
whole.201 Some positions are for limited terms while others are permanent.202 Though duties vary by jurisdiction, staff attorneys generally perform the same functions as judicial clerks.203 After receiving a case, they
review the lower court record, research relevant legal issues, and provide
recommendations to the judge on disposition.204 Though staff attorneys
frequently focus on pro se cases, they work on other kinds of cases as
well.205 Thus, staff attorneys, and especially permanent staff attorneys, offer
an opportunity to bring lawyers with empirical expertise into the court to
assist a large number of judges in better understanding relevant social
science research.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has considered the problem of suboptimal social science
in the development of common law precedent. Scholars and litigants have
fact. This notification would enable the parties to bring “their experts into the evaluation process.”
Monahan & Walker, supra note 48, at 509.
198 See Jim Schachter, High Court Needs Research Arm, Scholar Says, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1987,
at A1 (describing a proposal presented by Davis during a lecture at the University of San Diego).
199 See Miller & Barron, supra note 51, at 1240 (“The Court could appoint a panel of resident
social scientists, who would be requested to investigate matters of legislative fact which appear to
the Court to require further study.”).
200 I am grateful to Rob Friedman for a valuable conversation on this issue.
201 JUDICIAL CLERKSHIP COMM., CORNELL LAW SCH., JUDICIAL CLERKSHIP HANDBOOK 4 (2012), available at http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/publicservice/Students/upload/2012Clerkship-Handbook.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2013).
202 Id. at 4-5.
203 Id. at 4.
204 Elizabeth Armand & Malini Nangia, Judicial Clerkships: Federal Staff Attorney Positions,
NALP BULL., Dec. 2008, available at http://www.nalp.org/uploads/federal_staff_atty_positions.pdf.
205 JUDICIAL C LERKSHIP HANDBOOK, supra note 201, at 4.
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frequently argued that courts should ignore a particular social science
literature in resolving a question of precedent due to a diverse range of
problems with the literature. I have suggested that these reasons, on their
own, are frequently insufficient to ignore the research, because the cited
limitations appear to resurface even if the court chooses to ignore the
literature. Without guidance from systematic data and social science
research on complex empirical questions, judges must rely on their own
empirical intuitions formed through a process that is typically subject to the
same set of limitations.

